

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CHINESE APPROACHES TO MULTILATERALISM: CONVERGING OR DIVERGING?*

Avrupa Birliđi ve Çin'in Çok Taraflılık Yaklaşımları: Benzeşiyorlar Mı, Ayrışıyorlar Mı?

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Abstract

For a long time, the international political system has been recognised as a multilateral space. The actors within this system have different understandings of and approaches to multilateralism. The aim of this study is to examine the positions of the European Union (EU) and China with regard to multilateralism, taking them into account as related actors. The study includes chapters on the concept of multilateralism, the relationship between the EU and China, and European and Chinese perspectives on multilateralism. In the end, the research aims to determine the extent to which the EU and China share a common understanding of the concept of multilateralism.

Keywords: *Multilateralism, European Union, China, International Political System, EU-China Relations.*

Öz

Uluslararası siyasal sistem uzun zamandır çok taraflı bir alan olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Sistemdeki aktörlerin çok taraflılığa dair deđişen anlayışları ve yaklaşımları bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı birbiri ile ilişki halinde olan AB ve Çin'in çok taraflılık karşısındaki tutumlarını analiz etmektir. Çalışma çok taraflılığa, AB ve Çin arasındaki ilişkilere ve Avrupa ve Çin'in çok taraflılık bakış açılarını ele alan başlıklar içermektedir. Çalışmanın sonunda AB ve Çin'in çok taraflılık konusunda ne derecede benzer olduklarına dair bir çıkarımda bulunulması hedeflenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Çok Taraflılık, Avrupa Birliđi, Çin, Uluslararası Siyasal Sistem, AB-Çin İlişkileri.*

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INTRODUCTION

The international political system within which the European Union (EU) and China operate and engage is changing. There are two common assumptions about the ongoing reconfiguration of the international system. One of them is the declining power of the United States (US), largely due to its costly war campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, its declining economy and its weakening soft power, and the other one is the emergence of new centers of power that challenge the prevailing norms of the system. It is generally assumed that there is an ongoing shift towards a multipolar system based on the existence of several great powers and the absence of a hegemon.

In addition to the changing balance of power in the international system, widespread popular disquiet about the high levels of inequality associated with the intensification of globalisation, the increasing access of individuals to the global public sphere thanks to advances in technology and communication, and growing concern about the crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness of international organisations, especially in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, are also driving forces behind a likely change in the multilateral nature of the international political system (Ang, 2023). The simultaneous operation of all these processes has the potential to pave the way for a new form of multilateralism that will require a rethinking and revision of the existing post-Second World War concept of multilateralism (Geeraerts, 2011: 66).

Both China and the EU can be said to be among the winners of the enhanced multilateralism. They are highly dependent on global markets, on global finance, on global innovation and on the cooperation of other countries and regions. This study examines the positions of the EU and China in the changing international political system by focusing on their approaches to multilateralism and the dynamics prevailing in their mutual relations. The structure of this study is as follows: A short section introducing the concept of multilateralism, followed by a section on the EU-China relations, taking into account their changing nature. Another sub-title presents European and Chinese approaches to multilateralism in turn. The study concludes with a discussion of the extent to which the EU and China share a common understanding of multilateralism.

ON MULTILATERALISM AND CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

Multilateralism is often used interchangeably with multipolarity in the international relations literature because of their close links and frequent coexistence in the international system. Multilateralism generally provides a fertile ground for the emergence of multipolarity, and it can also evolve further in an environment of multipolarity, in which power is dispersed among several major actors with converging and diverging views on the system's distinctive features, and competing or cooperating to have a greater say in the design of the system (Muzaffar & et. al., 2017: 52).

Multilateralism takes on different meanings in different contexts. There is no single definition of what multilateralism is. This means that actors who claim to be acting in a multilateral way can behave in different ways, in line with their own way of multilateralism (Feng & He, 2023: 75). Smith attempted to identify multilateralism on the basis of three key characteristics, namely as the generation of and adherence to rules/norms, the promotion of reciprocity and inclusiveness, and the construction of institutions that embody these rules/norms and guarantee the principles of reciprocity and inclusiveness (Smith, 2018: 543). In this sense, multilateralism makes the anarchic nature of the international system more manageable by adding a degree of predictability to the system through the development of a common set of certain norms.

It is not always to possible to make a correct assumption about the multilateral tendencies in a given system. There may be a tendency towards multilateralism in a unipolar world, just as there may not be no significant features of multilateralism in a multipolar international system. The existence of multilateralism in a multipolarity heavily depends to a large extent on the choice of actors constituting the various poles, and on these actors' beliefs and calculations of these actors about the advantages of multilateralism. Incidentally, in any type of international system, there is always certain level of multilateralism based upon the existence of the relations between or among the actors

according to certain pre-determined principles (Ruggie, 1992: 568). For example, multilateralism has played a crucial role in shaping international politics in the post-World War II environment. It was widely believed that multilateralism was essential for achieving the common goals of peace, security and prosperity (Khushnam, 2022).

It is widely believed that the distribution of power in the current international political system is becoming more diffused and that the world politics is moving away from the so-called unipolarity of the post-Cold War era, with the decline of US as a leading power and the emergence of new powers, notably China (Chan, 2013: 5). Despite the ongoing debates about a shift towards multipolarity, the nature of the emerging multipolarity is still unclear. It is thought to be either competitive, based on national power and interest calculations, or cooperative, where multilateralism is experienced through norms and institutions (Grant & Barysch, 2008: 4). The ultimate nature of the international system will also affect the nature of the multilateralism in the system.

In a multipolar world where norms and values are contested, the smooth and effective functioning of the existing international institutions, as the pillars and symbols of the Cold War multilateralism, becomes more difficult (Laatikainen, 2013: 482). The growing criticisms of the main institutions of multilateral global governance, such as the United Nations Security Council, the Group of Eight or the International Monetary Fund, and the growing debates about their legitimacy, mostly due to the under-representation of emerging powers in such bodies, are a good illustration of this trend (Grant & Barysch, 2008: 4).

The complex nature of today's international political problems makes it difficult for any single actor to resolve them peacefully or by force. Therefore, a certain degree of multilateralism is an imperative in today's international political system, where there is a high degree of interdependence between actors. For example, the Covid-19 pandemic has had consequences that go beyond public health considerations and have complicated the ongoing debate about the nature of the international political system (Chauprade, 2020: 2-3).

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The changing balance of power in the international system, widespread popular unrest over the high level of inequality associated with the intensification of globalisation, the increasing access of individuals to the global public sphere thanks to advances in technology and communication, and growing concern over the crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness of international organisations, especially after the Covid-19 pandemic, are listed by Ang (2023) as the driving pillars of a probable change in the multilateral nature of the international political system, which is not in harmony with the prevailing conditions of the era. Moreover, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been widely portrayed as an attack on multilateralism (Raghavan, 2023). Thus, there are frequent claims of a crisis of multilateralism (in the form of a halt or retreat) due to the increasing role of competition within the international political system, in particular the geostrategic rivalry between the US and China and aggressive Russian revisionism directed against the West (Schuette, 2022). Some moments of failure, such as Brexit in Europe and the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), have also intensified the challenge to multilateralism (Kurniasari, 2021).

In short, there is an urgent need for a new type of multilateralism that reflects the peculiarities of the emerging international politics. Because the current system is inherently biased towards its Western creators. The new multilateralism should take into account the divergent expectations of the powers in the international political system, such as the Five Principles of Coexistence, which are seen as detrimental to a more just and equitable world order, in order to reach a pragmatic consensus, in which the powers pursue complementary and supportive foreign policies (Geeraerts, 2011: 66). Otherwise, the competition between the powers that want to have a greater say in the redesign of the system has the potential to lead to a violent clash.

EU-CHINA RELATIONS IN A NUTSHELL

The EU seeks to build a special kind of relationship with other key global players, called a strategic partnership (Biscop & Renard, 2010: 14). The EU and China set out in 2005 the ideal of transforming their relationship into a comprehensive strategic partnership, but the current partnership between them cannot be defined as strategic because it lacks a long-term

perspective, is heavily focused on the economic aspects of the relationship with a clear absence of high politics or security dimensions, and is broad in scope, covering a large number of sectors and priorities, rather than focused (Grant & Barysch, 2008: 18). The content of this particular type of relationship has hitherto been poorly defined.

China has been increasingly integrated into the international community since the late 1970s. Official relations between the EU and China were established in 1975. The first bilateral trade agreement between the two parties was signed in 1978. The EU imposed an arms embargo on China as a sanction for the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Since the 1990s, China has persistently called for the lifting of this embargo. Following the failure of the attempt to lift the arms embargo, China's view of the EU has changed considerably. The EU was widely seen as an actor incapable of acting independently of the US, which had doubts about the changing balance of power in the East China Sea with a decision to lift the embargo (Michalski & Pan, 2017: 57).

In the 1990s, the EU noted the rise of China as a military and economic power and defined closer engagement with China as a long-term policy objective, supporting China's integration into the international arena and multilateral platforms on security, political, environmental, social or economic issues, including membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (European Commission, 1997; Michalski & Pan, 2017: 155). The EU referred to its relations with China as a partnership for the first time in 1998 (European Commission) and the parties formally decided to upgrade their relations to the level of strategic partnership in 2003. From 1998 to 2008, China-EU summits were held every year and cooperation between the two sides was greatly enhanced. Areas of common interest for Europe and China: trade, investment, energy and environment (Geeraerts, 2011: 63). While the EU has been China's largest trading partner since 2004, China is the EU's second largest trading partner after the US. They also cooperate on human rights, maritime affairs, transport, fisheries, research and innovation, and development (Yan, 2015). In addition, the EU has provided substantial support to China's efforts to reach multilateral platforms. The most important of these has been WTO membership (Kim, 2004).

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The earlier positive atmosphere in EU-China relations came to an end in 2005. Since then, the problematic aspects of the relationship have steadily increased. On the EU side, the growing trade deficit with China, the country's lack of concern for the protection of intellectual property rights, its poor human rights record, its growing influence in Africa and its disregard for environmental, social, labour and safety standards in production processes have been problematic (Shambaugh, 2005: 10). The continuation of the EU's arms embargo against China, the EU's favourable relations with the separatist Tibetan leader the Dalai Lama, the Europeans' strange position on Taiwan and China's one-China policy, the never-ending alignment with the US on key international developments became sources of disappointment for the Chinese side (Men, 2012: 92-93; Narramore, 2008: 92-93). In such an atmosphere of growing mutual distrust, the 2008 annual meeting was unilaterally cancelled by China because of the scheduled meeting between French President Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama. The effect of this cancellation lasted for three years, and China demanded that the annual meeting be held. This time, it was the Europeans' turn to cancel the meeting, and they did so under the pretext of the urgent need to deal with the crisis situation in the eurozone (Men, 2012). In his Munich speech, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (2010) underlined China's interest in the EU: "We share broad consensus on promoting multilateralism and seeking peaceful solutions to international disputes, and we need closer cooperation in addressing climate change and other global challenges. Our common interests are expanding, our shared responsibilities in international affairs are increasing, the foundation of our cooperation is getting stronger and exchanges and coordination between us are growing. All these will lend a powerful boost to China-EU relations."

At present, EU-China relations contain elements of both cooperation and contention. The dynamics of the transatlantic relationship will affect the EU's perception of and relations with China. Under pressure from the US, the EU did not lift the arms embargo (due to sensitivities over technology transfer) (Grant & Barysch, 2008). Moreover, in recent years there has been a growing tendency in Europe to see China as a threat rather than an opportunity, especially in economic terms. The dominant economic parameters of China-EU economic relations have changed drastically in recent decades. Previously, the EU sent technology and

investment to China, while China provided cheap labour and low-cost goods. Today, however, China exports high-tech goods and its surplus capital (Men, 2011: 3). The EU is worried about its growing trade deficit with China, and European investors are becoming increasingly frustrated by Chinese protectionism (Grant & Barysch, 2008: 35).

The EU has tried to maintain this relationship in the shadow of Sino-US hostility. Europe has long resisted defining its China policy in terms of bloc logic, and has made plans for a new world order of cooperation to solve global problems (Joint statement of the 20th EU-China Summit, 2018). The EU's identity and position as an international actor depends very much on the recognition of its status by other international actors. In this sense, the EU needs to be taken seriously by China (Michalski & Pan, 2017: 155).

EU member states have different views on how to deal with China. For a long time, Europe was reluctant to define its policy towards China according to the logic of the bloc. Nevertheless, the tendency to have a negative image of China has become widespread in the West in recent years. In this sense, China has mostly been configured as a hostile state that threatens the US-led liberal world order (Sciorati, 2022). This mindset has added to the elements of mistrust and tension in EU-China relations, and has led the EU to hold multiple and simultaneous views of China, depending on the policy area: as a cooperating partner with whom the EU shares closely aligned objectives, as a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to balance interests, as an economic competitor seeking technological leadership, and as a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance. (European Union Global Strategy, 2016; Official Website of the EU). Additionally, the EU did not like China's reaction to the war in Ukraine. In spite of its close relations with Russia, China has tried to pursue a policy of neutrality in the event of a war in Ukraine. From European point of view, China has done nothing to improve the situation in Ukraine by using its influence with Putin (Haenle, et. al, 2023).

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THE EU'S AND CHINA'S VIEW OF THE MULTILATERAL WORLD ORDER

THE EU AND MULTILATERALISM

Multilateralism is at the heart of the European integration project, since the EU was founded on multilateralism and operates on the basis of multilateral processes. As a regional international organisation, the EU attaches greater importance to the role of international organisations in the international political system, in particular their role in providing a stable framework for dialogue between states.

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has faced problems in its old alliance with the US. Europe has grown weary of American unilateralism, and America's persistent hegemonic behaviour is seen as a source of instability in global politics. In this sense, heavy reliance on this alliance was no longer seen as sufficient to meet the EU's own objectives and interests (Biscop, 2018: 45). However, the strong interdependence between EU member states and the US has prevented the Union from taking critical decisions on the course of this relationship. By clinging to their Cold War habits, Europeans have largely relied on the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in security matters. Despite the steps taken after the end of the Cold War to build an independent defence identity and capacity, the Europeans have not yet been able to declare their independence from the US in this area (Posen, 2006: 184).

In the European Security Strategy, the EU developed the concept of effective multilateralism. Recognising that 'no single country can tackle today's complex problems alone', the strategy included a section entitled 'An international order based on effective multilateralism', which set out the Union's objective of 'developing a stronger international community, well-functioning international institutions and a rules-based international order'. The document also stressed that the EU should pursue its objectives "both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors" (European Council, 2003).

The EU's commitment to multilateralism was also formally expressed

in the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009 and symbolises the latest set of consensually agreed rules for European integration. Article 21 of the Treaty puts forth that 'the [European] Union shall... promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation'. Since the EU is devoid of well-developed military capabilities, it is unable to play great power politics perfectly that is prevailing under the multipolarity and it necessarily opts for less competitive multilateralism in which non-military power factors, such as the multilateral negotiations, create a change (Scott, 2013: 33; Venturi & Colombo, 2021).

Despite frequent comments about the EU's declining global influence, there are also those who predict that the EU will continue to be a significant global power in areas such as trade, environment, finance or energy, where it has exclusive or strong competences (Smith, 2013: 114). For example, the former President of the European Commission, Jose Barroso (2010), defended this idea in a substantial policy paper entitled "The European Union and Multilateral Global Governance". In this paper, he underlined the EU's role in contributing to and strengthening multilateral rules and institutions at the global level, and presented multilateralism as the right mechanism to build order and governance in a multipolar world.

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has faced problems in its old alliance with the US. The US began to lose faith in the benefits of the multilateral cooperation and institutions established after the Second World War and began to withdraw from such structures (Biscop, 2018: 45). In such an environment, the EU has maintained its belief in multilateralism and remained faithful to the ideal of making multilateral institutions dominant and strong in the international political system. Accordingly, the EU Council adopted a Conclusion containing a three-pronged strategy to strengthen the multilateral system. In this document, upholding international norms and agreements, extending multilateralism to new global realities and reforming multilateral organisations in line with their aspirations are listed as constituent parts of the EU's roadmap for promoting multilateralism (European Council, 2019). Moreover, the EU does not have well-developed military capabilities and is not in a position to play great power politics. It

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therefore opts for multilateralism, where non-military power factors, such as multilateral negotiations, have a chance to bring about change (Scott, 2013: 33).

One of the core objectives of the EU's external action is to promote the EU's model of governance and values in order to create a safer neighbourhood and a safer world. In pursuing this objective, the EU shows a preference for multilateral cooperation, preferring to address international challenges through collective action (Biscop & Renard, 2010: 13). In conducting its foreign policy, the EU has mostly relied on Western or colonial-style multilateralism, making extensive use of trade, aid and conditionality mechanisms (Geeraerts, 2011: 63). This approach to foreign policy, which creates hierarchical relationships and normalises pressure on other parties to conform to EU standards, is becoming less effective and less attractive in today's world politics. This means that the EU needs a new style of multilateralism that is more persuasive and seeks to build relationships with third parties on an equal footing (Smith, 2013: 124).

CHINA AND MULTILATERALISM

Since its admission to the United Nations system in 1971, China has been a very active participant in the multilateral institutions. China has prioritised multilateralism, especially its participation in multilateral conventions for economic cooperation to achieve its national goals, especially since the radical change in its foreign policy stance with the adoption of the Reform and Opening Policy in 1978 (Klemensits, 2022: 15). Initially, integration to world politics served the country's ideal of being a winner in the global economy and was limited to the economic sphere. Over time, the topics have diversified. They have even expanded to include security and human rights. In addition, in the first instance China acted only as a rule-taker and then moved on to the role of a rule-breaker and a norm-maker. In other words, at the moment it is pursuing an active strategy to shape the multilateral system (Banik & Bull, 2022: 209, 210).

China sees a peaceful international environment as vital to the realisation of its national interests, especially the continuation of its

economic development. At the World Economic Forum (WEF), President Xi Jinping (2017) raised the issue of the importance of promoting and maintaining multilateralism to face economic globalization and achieve mutually beneficial results of growth and prosperity. Rather than a sincere adherence to the ideal of the common good, China cares about the common good of the international community as long as it serves its national goals well. In this sense, China approaches multilateralism mostly as a useful tool to enhance its global image and make it strong in achieving its global aspirations (Scott, 2013: 39). From the Chinese perspective, therefore, multilateralism is not an end in itself, but a means by which states can achieve their own individual goals in an environment of dialogue that reduces the risk of violent conflict between states (Odgaard & Biscop, 2006: 8).

Economic success has given China a high level of confidence in its foreign policy, which is easily seen in China's expanding role in international organisations and its growing diplomatic ties around the world (Geeraerts, 2011: 57). Since its emergence as a great power, China has shown a clear tendency to integrate itself into the Western-led international system based on multilateralism (Deng, 2007: 882). Notwithstanding its endorsement of multilateralism, Wang (2021) notes that the Chinese have a different concept of multilateralism than the West. However, it has sometimes called for major revisions to the system to make it fairer and more just. Accordingly, China has promoted the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" (defined as mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) as elements to be strongly considered in revising the current system. On the one hand, China pragmatically accepts the existing norms of the international political system, but on the other hand, it also pursues a strategy of transforming the rules within the system in the medium or long term to make them more conducive to Chinese interests (Odgaard & Biscop, 2006: 8). As a result, China is relying more on diplomacy and has developed positive bilateral and multilateral relationships (Naramore, 2008: 91).

In recent years, China has shown an active diplomacy, making efforts to establish peaceful relations with its neighbours, even those with whom

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it has historically been at odds (Wang, 2010). By declaring its grand strategy of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to create a high level of connectivity from Asia to the end of the European continent through massive investment projects, at the 19th Communist Party Congress in October 2017, China demonstrated its high level of commitment to multilateralism. However, this strategy has been widely interpreted as an attempt to transform its economic power into political power (Biscop, 2018: 42). In addition, China has sought to strengthen its ties with African countries by offering various types of aid, which are seen as more attractive than Western-oriented aid because there is no conditionality that forces them to act in a certain way (Wang, 2010: 563).

China has always valued its sovereignty and independence more than its integration into the global political and economic system. China's priority has been to expand its domestic economic development in the short term, and playing the role of a responsible strong power seems to be the country's long-term goal (Geeraerts, 2011: 62). This put a limit on its multilateralism. In the last decade, however, rather than being a passive bystander or freerider, China, with its growing power and influence, has become a more responsible player, engaging in a wide range of global challenges such as counter-terrorism, environmental degradation and global warming, energy security, international crime, international peacekeeping and nation-building, nuclear non-proliferation, public health and the stability of the global financial system (Shambaugh, 2005: 7-8; Gross & Jian, 2012: 212). On these issues, China is also interacting with other key players in the global political arena. In a speech, Xi Jinping (2020) described the shift in China's approach to multilateralism in the following way: "China believes that to practice genuine multilateralism, we must pursue win-win cooperation but not zero-sum games, be fair and just without bullying others, focus on action without empty talk, respect diversity and say no to hegemony."

Multilateral institutions are seen by China as useful channels to check or balance American power and unilateralism. In addition to advocating a greater role for the UN in international affairs, China has also been active in regional international organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (Wang, 2010: 560-561). China has become more

confident in the concept of multilateralism with its rapidly growing power and successful experience in international and regional multilateral frameworks (Men, 2012: 340). As long as it is possible to do so, China is trying to maintain a high degree of autonomy by refraining from an alliance with a single power or with a regional organisation (Deng, 2007: 866). This is largely due to the fact that China's understanding of sovereignty differs significantly from that of the other major powers, and that China attaches great importance to sovereignty, even considering the sovereign equality of states as a fundamental principle of international law (Wenhua, 2008: 57). This affects its multilateralism, in particular its approach to international treaties and its practices within international organisations.

CONCLUSION

Both China and Europe want to be part of a multilateral international political system, which opens up a window of opportunity for their potential cooperation. This means there is some agreement between Europeans and China on the main features of the emerging international system. The EU and China share a strong belief in the benefits of a rules-based multilateral trading system for achieving sustainable economic growth and prosperity, and a commitment to upholding the rules-based multilateral trading system, where free trade prevails over protectionist tendencies. While the EU promotes democratic values globally and wants to see China's transition to a full democracy, China sees respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, together with the principle of non-interference, as superseding all other principles of international law and accepts them as its red line.

As a regional international organisation, the EU attaches greater importance to the role played by international organisations in the international political system, particularly when it comes to providing a stable framework for dialogue between states. It actively promotes the involvement of China in international organisations as a means of ensuring that China complies with international law. China also sees international organisations as useful instruments for controlling or balancing US power. In addition to pushing for a greater role for the UN in international affairs, China has also been active in regional

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international organisations such as ASEAN and the SCO.

There are tensions in their relations that stem from their differences, such as their reliance on different cultural and political traditions, norms and values, despite their overlapping interests in the dominance of multilateralism in the international system. What China values more in multilateralism is the existence of several great powers in the international political system and the equal recognition of each power; on the other hand, the EU values more the choice of the actors to act and to cooperate. Such a difference may be the result of the different roles of the two actors in the formation of the multilateralism in place today. After the Second World War, Europe was an insider in the process of creating the system. China, on the other hand, was a latecomer to the system, having been largely excluded from the founding group. In other words, China has not been an active participant in the design of the current system of multilateralism that is the product of developments during and after the Second World War. Rather than making a permanent choice between rivalry and partnership, it is more likely that both the European Union and China will be willing to exploit the opportunities of multilateralism in a multipolar system, ensuring the coexistence and predominance of competition or cooperation in various aspects of their relations.

Because of the changing foreign policy conduct of the US, the EU was no longer able to see the US as its natural or traditional partner in a multilateral world order. Since the start of the Trump era in 2017, the US has openly demonstrated its aversion to the maintenance of a multilateral world order, including the trade and monetary dimensions. In that sense, the EU wants to see China as a responsible global power and as an ally in building and operating an effective multilateralism.

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