PLATON’UN THEAİTETOS’UNDA 201A-C’DE MAHKEME ÖRNEĞİNE DAİR BAZI İHTİLAFLAR VE ÇAĞDAŞ EPİSTEMOLOJİYE DAİR İZLERİ ÜZERİNE
Abstract
Theaitetos diyaloğunda bilgi tanımlanırken sorgulanan tanımlardan biri bilginin doğru inanç olup olmadığıdır. Bu tanımın kabul edilemezliği doğruluk ve inancın birlikte bilgi için yeterli olmadığı bir karşı örnek tasarlanarak, mahkeme örneği üzerinden açıklanır. Genel kabule göre bu örnek, doğru inancın bilgi olmadığını göstermesi bakımından yeterlidir. Burnyeat ikna-öğretim, görme-duyma karşıtlıkları temelinde şekillenen pasajın bazı tartışmalara neden olduğuna dikkat çeker ve ileri sürülen karşı örnekte 3 farklı paradoks bulunduğunu iddia eder. Bunlardan özellikle ikincisinin Platon’un bilgiye ilişkin düşüncelerini yorumlamak açısından önemli olduğunu ileri sürer. Bu anlamda çalışmanın birinci amacı söz konusu mahkeme örneğinin nasıl çalıştığını ortaya koyarken Burnyeat’ın ikinci paradoks olarak ileri sürdüğü durumun bir açıklamasını içerecektir.
Mahkeme örneğinin yol açtığı tartışmalarla başlangıçta yapılan bilginin neliğine dair araştırmanın ötesine geçilir. Özellikle bu örnekte dikkati çeken ikna-öğretim ve görme-duyma karşıtlıklarının sonuçları çağdaş epistemolojide önemli bir yer tutan tanıklık epistemolojisine dair izler barındırmaktadır. Tanıklığın bilgisinin olup olmaması, resmi ya da doğal tanıklık gibi konular tanıklık epistemolojisi içerisinde incelenir. Bu anlamda çalışmanın diğer amacı, pasajın tanıklık epistemolojisiyle ilişkisine dikkat çekmektir.
Keywords
References
- Allen, D. S. (1996). “A Schedule of Boundaries: An Exploration, Launched from the Water-Clock of Athenian Time”, Greece & Rome, 43 (2): 157-168.
- Audi, R. (2002). “The Sources of Knowledge”, in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul K. Moser (ed.). 71-95, Oxford University Press.
- Brodie, S. (2016). “The Knowledge Unacknowledged in the Theaetetus”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Caston, Victor (ed.), 87-118. 51.
- Burnyeat, M. F. (1980). “Socrates and the Jury: Paradoxes in Plato’s Distinction between Knowledge and True Belief (Part 1)”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54(suppl.), 173–91.
- Burnyeat, M. F. (1990). The Theaetetus of Plato, translation by M.J. Levett, Hackett Publishing Company.
- Chappell, S. G. (2023). “Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/plato-theaetetus/>.
- Coady, C.A. J. (1994). Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford University Press.
- Gerson, L. P. (2006). Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato, Oxford University Press.
- Giannopoulou, Z. (2013). Plato’s Theaetetus as a Second Apology, Oxford University Press.
- McDowell, J. (1973). Plato Theaetetus: Translated with Notes by John Mcdowell, Oxford University Press.
- Nawar, T. (2013). “Knowledge and True Belief at Theaetetus 201a–c”. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1-18.
- Plato (1921). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 translated by Harold N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd.
- Platon (2015). Theaitetos, Diyaloglar içinde, çev. Macit Gökberk, 12.basım, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
- Pritchard, D. (2006). What is This Thing Called Knowledge?, Routledge.
- Vogt, K. M. (2012). Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, Oxford University Press.
EXAMINING CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE COURT EXAMPLE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS 201A-C AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY
Abstract
In the dialogue "Theaetetus," one of the definitions under discussion pertains to whether knowledge can be equated with true belief or not. The unacceptability of this definition is demonstrated through the use of a counterexample, specifically in the context of a court case, to illustrate that truth and belief together are insufficient for knowledge. In accordance with prevailing consensus, this exemplar effectively demonstrates the insufficiency of true belief for knowledge. Burnyeat draws attention to the passage, which is structured upon the dialectics of persuasion-teaching and seeing-hearing and underscores the controversies it has engendered. Furthermore, Burnyeat posits the presence of three distinct paradoxes within the counterexample advanced. He posits that the second of these paradoxes is of particular significance in the context of interpreting Plato's conceptions of knowledge. In this regard, the primary objective of the study is to elucidate the functioning of the court case example, while also encompassing an explanation of the situation advanced by Burnyeat as the second paradox.
The discussions stemming from the Court example extend beyond the initial investigation into the nature of knowledge. The outcomes of the persuasion-teaching and seeing-hearing dichotomies, prominently showcased in this example, exhibit traces of the epistemology of testimony, a significant facet of contemporary epistemology. Matters pertaining to testimonial knowledge, formal or natural testimony, are examined within the framework of the epistemology of testimony. In this context, another objective of the study is to underscore the connection between the passage and the epistemology of testimony.
Keywords
References
- Allen, D. S. (1996). “A Schedule of Boundaries: An Exploration, Launched from the Water-Clock of Athenian Time”, Greece & Rome, 43 (2): 157-168.
- Audi, R. (2002). “The Sources of Knowledge”, in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul K. Moser (ed.). 71-95, Oxford University Press.
- Brodie, S. (2016). “The Knowledge Unacknowledged in the Theaetetus”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Caston, Victor (ed.), 87-118. 51.
- Burnyeat, M. F. (1980). “Socrates and the Jury: Paradoxes in Plato’s Distinction between Knowledge and True Belief (Part 1)”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54(suppl.), 173–91.
- Burnyeat, M. F. (1990). The Theaetetus of Plato, translation by M.J. Levett, Hackett Publishing Company.
- Chappell, S. G. (2023). “Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2023/entries/plato-theaetetus/>.
- Coady, C.A. J. (1994). Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford University Press.
- Gerson, L. P. (2006). Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato, Oxford University Press.
- Giannopoulou, Z. (2013). Plato’s Theaetetus as a Second Apology, Oxford University Press.
- McDowell, J. (1973). Plato Theaetetus: Translated with Notes by John Mcdowell, Oxford University Press.
- Nawar, T. (2013). “Knowledge and True Belief at Theaetetus 201a–c”. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1-18.
- Plato (1921). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12 translated by Harold N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd.
- Platon (2015). Theaitetos, Diyaloglar içinde, çev. Macit Gökberk, 12.basım, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
- Pritchard, D. (2006). What is This Thing Called Knowledge?, Routledge.
- Vogt, K. M. (2012). Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, Oxford University Press.
Details
| Primary Language | Turkish |
|---|---|
| Subjects | Logic, Systematic Philosophy (Other) |
| Journal Section | Research Article |
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | December 15, 2023 |
| Submission Date | October 30, 2023 |
| Acceptance Date | December 3, 2023 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2023 Issue: 78 |
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